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Affirmative Action in South Africa:
Transformation or Tokenism?
Penelope E Andrews*

Introduction
With the grand narrative of apartheid relegated to the status of an
historical relic, the new South African narrative of non-racialism and
nation-building is unfolding in remarkable ways. Since 1994, after the
historic election, the South African government has found itself faced
with enormous challenges. The first chapter of the unfolding narrative is
the challenge of transformation: the movement from symbolism to
substance, from individual aspiration to structural accommodation.
The new government found itself confronted with a host of
contradictory political and economic forces. First, the reality of
globalisation and the reification of markets substantially circumscribed
the economic choices available to the government. This factor contradicted the political imperatives of redistribution in a society so plagued
by economic inequality. In other words, even though the accepted
political rhetoric had for decades been that the new South Africa would
embrace socialist principles, the limitations posed by the new global
economic order put paid to this idea.' Second, in the Western world,
cultural clashes fuelled by 'identity politics' influenced some of the
debates in South Africa concerning the substance of the new non-racial
democracy (Meli, 1988: 67; Murray and Kaganis, 1994: 17). Part of the
discourse related to indigenous minorities and how this new
majoritarian democratic order would accommodate their interests
(Andrews, 1998: 318).
The new South African government recognised that the euphoria of
political transformation would be enormously deflated if the economic
status quo were not modified. In brief, political rights had to lead to
economic gains for a significant proportion of the population if the new
democracy was to survive. Since post Cold War political realities put
paid to any socialist aspirations, only certain limited options were
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possible in the new political paradigm. One such option drawn from
elsewhere was affirmative action.
Particularly since its entry upon the legal and policy stage in the
United States just over 30 years ago, affirmative action2 has generated
the kind of passionate debate generally reserved for subjects touching on
moral questions, like abortion or capital punishment. Whether affirmative action refers to the Malaysian experiment of unconditional setasides for Malays, or India's modest attempts to incorporate
Untouchables into the wider economic order through education and
employment, or the United States' efforts at redressing the legacy of

slavery, subordination and discrimination through various affirmative
action programs, ideological polarisation ensures that reasoned debate
on the subject is well nigh impossible. Both supporters and opponents of
affirmative action are able to muster statistics to support their positions,
and often a dose of anecdote makes the point even clearer. 3 In the swell
of the debate, the historical context and the question of alternatives are
rarely to be seen. For opponents the mantra of non-racialism, formal
equal opportunity and the dogma of merit demonstrate the flaws of
affirmative action. For proponents, the remnants of racism and the
unquestioning logic of justice and equality provide ample justification for
such programs and policies (Carter, 1991).
The genie had been out of the bottle for some time before South
Africa had to face this issue squarely. As had been the case in the United
States in the heady days of societal consensus around civil rights, in
South Africa too there was general agreement at the constitutional
negotiations that racism in all its manifestations needed to be
eradicated. But the shape of such strategies would identify some
significant differences amongst those committed to the eradication of
apartheid.4 One of the ironies surrounding the issue of affirmative action
in South Africa is the easy way its purpose and subsequent acceptance
have been transmogrified from that of a palliative mechanism to a
transforming one. In the fairly recent past, introduction of the approach
into South African political parlance was greeted with cynicism; a device
for co-opting the black bourgeoisie. Such earlier observations by black
political activists now provide fertile ground for certain opponents of
affirmative action, particularly those who argue that nepotism and
tokenism will inevitably underpin affirmative action programs (Kemp,
1992: 13).

LAW IN CONTEXT

In South Africa the realisation of affirmative action goals occurs in a
context somewhat at odds with those societies where such experiments
have taken place, for example, in Malaysia, India and the United States.5
Within those contexts the ambition was largely to redress the structural
impediments facing significant minorities burdened by racial, ethnic or
caste disadvantage and discrimination. The paradigm of affirmative
action is a limited one, incorporating the demands of discrete minorities
who continue to make claims on the majority because of their outsider
and minority status. Affirmative action is not seen as a transformational
measure. But in South Africa the purposes of affirmative action involve
an interplay with the overall goals of political and economic reconstruction of the society. Both in its constitutional directives and in the
Reconstruction and Development Program (the RDP), affirmative action
becomes part and parcel of the transformation project.6 Affirmative
action therefore incorporates not just policies and programs designed to
provide individual access to employment, education and other resources,
but also those aimed at 'uplifting' impoverished communities historically
disadvantaged by apartheid laws and policies.' It has been observed that:
Affirmative action in South Africa has nothing to do with creating
opportunities for a minority. Rather, it means transforming an economy
that once barred 75 per cent of the population from any meaningful role
(Menaker, 1994: 5A).
The Reconstruction and Development Program aims are to harness
South Africa's human capital to transform the economy and the society.
The RDP incorporates affirmative action not as a fleeting phenomenon,
but as a process that is integrally tied to the business culture, academic
endeavours and the public service.8 The majority black population
displays unequivocal support for affirmative action. However, they are
prospectively the major beneficiaries of affirmative action and are
dependent on the minority white population, particularly the corporate
sector, to make such programs possible. In short, despite the widespread
political support for affirmative action, such programs may run into
problems because of white dominance of the economy.
This chapter addresses the issue of affirmative action in the newly
democratic South Africa. It outlines the relatively easy adoption of
affirmative action as principle and policy by the government, despite the
likelihood that specific programs of affirmative action were likely to
generate particular problems. The chapter locates affirmative action as
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part of the overall agenda of transformation. It argues that, although
racial identity was in the past utilised in the most opportunistic and
pernicious ways by successive apartheid governments, the use of racial
identity to further the aims of affirmative action will not contradict the
present government's commitment to a non-racial democracy.
Section One deals with the legacy of apartheid. It argues that the
rationale for affirmative action can be found in notions of compensatory
and distributive justice, and diversity, and that the specific race
conscious approach 9 will not detract from the ideal of non-racialism
espoused by the majority party in government, the African Nationalist

Congress. Section Two describes the first piece of affirmative action
legislation and addresses some likely problems with the implementation
of affirmative action programs, specifically in relation to their shape and
the purported beneficiaries. Section Three focuses on the question of
equality and the judiciary's approach to the issue. This section also
discusses the first successful legal challenge to an affirmative action
program of the Ministry of Justice. Section Four surveys the possibilities
and limitations of affirmative action in South Africa, despite its popular
support and prima facie constitutional protection. Implicit in the enquiry
is the recognition that affirmative action remains one of a series of
governmental assaults on poverty and economic inequality, and that
affirmative action policies on their own cannot substitute for these
governmental interventions.

Section One: The Legacy of Apartheid
Affirmative action is the principled means of dealing, in as just and
realistic a manner as possible, with the progressive eradication of the gulf
created by past discrimination between black and white men and women.
From the strategic point of view, it must be seen as an alternative both to
waiting centuries for the market on its own to eliminate the massive
inequalities left by apartheid, on the one hand, and to lawless confiscation
and arbitrary sharing out on the other.l1
This imprimatur from South Africa's most prominent citizen echoes
popular sentiment in South Africa: that affirmative action programs are
crucial to the eradication of the legacy of cemented racism and sexism,
which typified the apartheid social, economic, political and legal edifice.
Apartheid laws and policies left in their wake widespread racial
disparities which will plague the society for many generations. These
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disparities have been comprehensively documented and can be found
across the societal spectrum (Sachs, 1993: 107). The apartheid state, for
example, unabashedly spent four times more on education for a white
child than it did on an African child; it granted preferential credit and
grants to white farmers and not their black counterparts, and paid white
pensioners more than blacks."
The apartheid government's racial allocation of resources on
education, health, welfare, housing and many other areas ensured that
black people were locked into a spiral of dispossession, dislocation and
poverty. These scant examples represent an ubiquitous system of discrimination and deprivation. Apartheid's particularly Kafkaesque
system not only racialised the availability of resources through government spending, but a labyrinth of laws and policies ensured that black
South Africans' access to resources through employment, access to
property and other private economic activity were severely circumscribed. Laws and policies which regulated the movement of black labour
and access to housing, with its deleterious impact on family life,
cemented the economic inferiority of black South Africans (Budlender,
1985: 3).
This legacy rendered it essential that socio-economic rights could not
be ignored in the new constitutional dispensation. The drafters of both
the transitional and final Constitutions, and particularly representatives
from the African National Congress, ensured the inclusion of socioeconomic rights as fully justiciable in the Bill of Rights (Liebenberg,
1995: 375; Jeffrey, 1993: 8). It is within this context that affirmative
action is located; as a meaningful mechanism to transform not only the
political status quo, but the socio-economic edifice as well.
This unequivocal political support for affirmative action in South
Africa contrasts with the complicated political arrangement in the
United States, where the courts in particular are recoiling from past
affirmative action mechanisms designed and implemented in more
generous times.2 This backdrop of hostile challenges in the courts
signified to the South African constitutional framers the importance of
constitutional protection for affirmative action policies and programs
(Galanter, 1991: 18; Harris, 1993: 1709).
South African constitutional lawyers could draw on other models of
affirmative action, most notably the Malaysian one, or the Indian model,
and, of course, the ubiquitous American one. 3 The most uncontroversial

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

was to be found in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (the Racial Discrimination Convention)" 4 and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst
Women (CEDAW). "
The Racial Discrimination Convention provides that:
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take in the
social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures
to ensure the adequate development of protection of certain racial groups
or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
... (Art 2(2)).

Article 1(4) provides further that:
special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring
such protection as may be necessary . . . shall not be deemed racial

discrimination.
Similarly, CEDAW (Article 4, Sections 1 and 2) provides as follows:
Adoption by States parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be
considered discrimination as defined in the Convention, but shall in no
way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
standards. These measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
Adoption by States parties of special measures including those measures
contained in the present convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall
not be considered discriminatory.
The South African government has ratified both conventions.
Policy justifications for affirmative action
The rationale for affirmative action has been well canvassed in the
literature" and is broadly categorised under three headings:
(i) The notion of compensatory justice: implicit in this notion is the
idea that the society has to compensate for the particular legacy
of racial oppression and exclusion, the effects of which continue
to burden the subordinated community. This notion has been
articulated in the United States in several Supreme Court
decisions, particularly in the early affirmative action cases."
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(ii) The notion of distributivejustice: this forms part of an idea that a
fair and just society should afford opportunity to all its citizens;
it is linked to universal notions of the civic duty. An American
scholar has articulated this notion succinctly:
The personal sacrifice entailed by preferential policies is an
obligation of citizenship just as taxes are: everyone has a role to play
in reducing the debts that the society has undertaken, and the debts
may be moral as well as financial (Carter, 1991: 256 n 5).
(iii) The notion of diversity: proponents of affirmative action in both
South Africa and the United States argue that the workforce
should represent the racial and gender makeup of the society at
large, and that there is both a moral and economic good in this
approach; that diversity is not merely compatible with
excellence, but actually promotes it (Sachs, 1993: 110; Kennedy,
1990: 705).
The purpose of affirmative action has been stated to redress systemic
or structural discrimination; it differs from the traditional antidiscrimination model in that it does not arise from individual
complaints. Underpinning affirmative action is the notion that stereotypes and prejudice exist at the subconscious as well as conscious level to
thwart access and advancement for large numbers of disadvantaged
groups. Equal treatment is seen as compounding the legacy of structural
discrimination; the only equitable path is seen as some kind of
preferential treatment. 1
All three rationales will find justification in South Africa. The
history of deprivation, discrimination and disadvantage has left unambiguous the need for redress and compensation. The commitment to
distributive justice is found in the Reconstruction and Development
Program, which outlines the goals of transformation. It has been
recognised that the legacy of racial (and gender) exclusion in South
Africa has stifled the accumulation of human capital, a precondition for
successful economic development and growth (Ford, 1996: 31). The
political platform of the African National Congress is strident about the
party's commitment to the philosophy of non-racialism (Mandela, 1994;
Frederickse, 1990). This version of non-racialism clearly reflects the
ultimate goal of the society, while recognising the need to address the
historical and contemporary encumbrances of racism (and sexism)
wherever they are manifested. Although the principle of equality
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underpins the text of the Bill of Rights (Albertyn, 1994), there is room for
the policy of affirmative action. Section 9 states that:
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
This constitutional recognition will go some way towards providing
protection against constitutional challenges to programs and laws that
establish affirmative action.

Section Two: Problems of Implementation
Where affirmative action programs have been implemented, they have
largely arisen as temporary measures in response to the apparent
intransigence of racism and sexism, and they may not always have been
very popularly received. In the United States, for example, it is arguable
that there never has been widespread support for affirmative action and
that the whole enterprise has consistently been subjected to scepticism
and ambivalence (Brooks, 1990: 323). The Malaysian experiment
appears to have enjoyed some success largely because of that government's commitment to transforming, or at least making the public sector
represent, the dominant face of Malaysian society. But these measures,
sometimes leading to nepotism or cronyism, have not been without their
critics (Basham, 1983: 67). Affirmative action programs in India have
also been subjected to considerable critique."9
It seems clear, therefore, that what affirmative action needs to
address is the structural impediments to advancement created by racism
and sexism. In South Africa, where the overwhelming number of poor
people are black, removing racist and sexist barriers to advancement is
in effect an attack on poverty. In addition and in combination with other
governmental measures, thoughtfully designed affirmative action programs should therefore be able to attack the vast inequalities from which
working people and poor people suffer.
This is the approach taken in South Africa. From its constitutional
enshrinement to its inclusion in the Reconstruction and Development
Program, affirmative action is seen as part and parcel of the overall
transformation. As already noted, there is widespread political support
for the policy in South Africa. From the beginnings of the constitutional

LAW IN CONTEXT

negotiations about the shape of the new society, affirmative action was
quite easily accepted as both just and necessary for the newly
enfranchised majority. However, in the years preceding the drafting of
the Constitution and the first democratic elections, this clouded a
thorough analysis of the problems associated with implementation of
affirmative action programs and policies. Although fundamental jurisprudential questions about equality and affirmative action were well
canvassed (Klug, 1991: 133), significant issues did not receive the same
attention. These issues included the failure to articulate clearly who the
proposed beneficiaries should be instead of the general assumption that
'non-whites' would be the major beneficiaries. Similarly, there was no
clearly stated position regarding the use of goals, quotas, timetables, or
the shape or character of the various programs. For example, would
affirmative action in education be similar to such programs in
employment? In other words, it appears that for a myriad of reasons the
major political protagonists were lulled into a sense that the political
commitment to affirmative action would adequately deal with the
challenges it might face.
This is not to suggest that these specific details were not given some
consideration. They were included in many of the discussions during the
years leading to democratic elections. However, because a constitutional
accord on the matter needed to be reached, the finer details were left for
future consideration.
Affirmative action was made compulsory in the public service
immediately following the elections in 1994, by amendment of the Public
Service Act 1994 so as to allow for a candidate's race, gender or disability
to be taken into account in considering the suitability of that candidate
for appointment or promotion. The legislation left intact the traditional
requirements of suitability for appointment or promotion: qualifications,
training, education and other standard indicators of merit.20
The political realities of South Africa today suggest that, in the long
term, affirmative action in the public sector will not continue to be a
cause for concern. In other words, black South Africans will continue to
be employed in significant numbers. First, the constitutional compromise
to secure that jobs of white public servants for a stated period will fall
away in 1999. In fact, many senior white public servants have already
accepted early retirement packages, some remarkably generous. Second,
the country is governed by blacks" and it is not too far fetched to
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imagine that the public service will increasingly reflect that reality. The
current Vice-President, who will presumably be the next President of
South Africa, has already launched what is called the 'African
Renaissance' and which will arguably have far reaching consequences for
the public sector. However, the Public Service Act formed the basis for
the first legal challenge to an affirmative action program (discussed in
Section Three of this chapter), so even an optimistic prognosis of
possibilities of affirmative action in the public sector cannot ignore the
resistance which still dominates large sectors of the public service.
However, for the reasons just stated, these are short-term problems that
will not linger. Moreover, the government appears determined to
overcome the opposition and a White Paper addressing affirmative
action in the public service was launched in April 1998 by the Minister of
Public Service and Administration (This Week in South Africa 28 April 4 May 1988: 4).
It is in the private sector that affirmative action has been faced with
the most difficult challenges. Up until 1998, the government had hoped
that the private commercial sector would voluntarily introduce
affirmative action programs, therefore countering the need for state
regulation and intervention. However, the record thus far suggests that
businesses in South Africa have been quite recalcitrant with respect to
affirmative action (Montsi, 1993: 49). This recalcitrance is reflected, first,
in the refusal of white businesses to consider the appointment of black
candidates because they fear that in the process merit will be jettisoned
or standards dropped; and, second, in their engagement in tokenism or
window-dressing, that is, appointing black candidates to positions way
beyond their skills or experience, and then using that appointment as a
symbol of the company's commitment to affirmative action (Sachs, 1993:
120). This practice is particularly insidious because the candidate's
inability to satisfactorily fulfill his or her task, or their never being
treated in the way a white person similarly situated would, often
reinforces the prejudice that black candidates are just not up to the job
(Sparks, 1990: 214; Kelin, 1997: 55).
This state of affairs led to the passage of the first piece of affirmative
action legislation in late 1998, the Employment Equity Act. The Act,
introduced by the Minister of Labour, seeks to achieve equity in the
workplace by:
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*
*

promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment
through the elimination of unfair discrimination; and
implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups, in
order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational
categories and levels in the workforce (Chapter 1, ss 2(a) and (b)).

The Act targets as 'designated groups' Black people (African people,
people classified as 'Coloureds' and Indian South Africans), women and
people with disabilities (Chapter 1 (i)). The Act's application is
expansive. It applies to all employers who employ 50 or more employees,
but excludes from its ambit local government, the National Defence
Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret
Service. Significantly, it includes all organs of state as defined in the
Constitution (Chapters 1(i) and 4).
The Act tabulates a series of steps which all 'designated employers'
must take to satisfy its vision, and to reach the stated goal of
employment equity. These steps include:
*

preparing a profile of its employee population;

*

analysing its employment practices and policies, and specifically
identifying employment barriers which negatively affect members
of disadvantaged groups;

*

preparing and implementing an employment equity plan which
sets out objectives, goals, timetables, procedures to implement
and monitor the plan;

*

assigning specific personnel to implement and monitor the plan;

*

informing its workforce about the provisions of the Act and any
other documents pertaining thereto, as well as making a copy of
the employment equity plan available to employees;

*

lodging a summary of the employment equity plan with the
Department of Labour; and

*

reporting annually to the Department of Labour on progress in
the implementation of its plan (Chapter III (13)(1)).22

The Act provides for the establishment of a Commission for
Employment Equity to serve in an advisory capacity to the Minister of
Labour, and as an educational, research and public relations body. The
Act provides that the Commission will consist of groups representing
organised labour, organised business, government, organised community
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and development interests. The Act also provides that groups choosing
representatives to the Commission should have 'due regard to promoting
the representivity' of black, women and people with disabilities (Chapter
IV (2a) (2) and (3)).
The monitoring and enforcement provided for in the Act utilises the
existing industrial relations tools established under the Labour
Relations Act 1995. Significantly, it adopts the dispute resolution model
of the Act by utilising the services of the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (Chapter V,B (46), but allocates exclusive
jurisdiction to the Labour Court 'to determine any dispute about the

interpretation or application' of the Act (Chapter V, B (49)). In the event
of a finding of unfair discrimination, the Labour Court has the power to
award compensatory or punitive damages, and to order employers to
take steps to prevent future discrimination (Chapter V, B (50)).
The Act represents a careful balancing of voluntarism and coercion.
Its introduction indicates the failure of the corporate sector to commit
itself unequivocally to the principle of affirmative action and to introduce
well structured and thoughtful programs in the workplace.2 3 The Act also
signifies the continued agitation on the part of the majority black
population for some share in the economic benefits of the society now
that the political battle has been overcome.
Although it is undisputed that affirmative action as principle and as
policy are now accepted as part of the transformation project in South
Africa, there are many challenges which it has spurned. The two most
significant gaps bear directly on the political future of the country and
the success of the principle of non-racialism. The first challenge touches
on the issue of racial identity; the second on the battle around merit or
standards.
Identity
The question of racial identity is obviously central in the administration
of affirmative action programs and policies. The architects of the
transitional and final South African Constitutions provided the
constitutional shield; they did not (and probably could not) spell out with
specificity how 'disadvantage' was to be ascribed and prioritised. They
approached this issue with a deep commitment to the principles of nonracialism coupled with some optimism. They could probably not have
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predicted how apartheid's labyrinth of racial identification would create
'a competitive market in identity' (Ford, 1996: 1954) accompanied by
some bitterness and rancour (Strydom, 1997: 911). Although all official
documents describe members of disadvantaged communities as African,
'Coloured' and Indian, popular sentiment does not always reflect that
understanding. As the country transforms itself politically and culturally
and as it gradually leans towards its African realities (geographically
and culturally) there has seeped into popular discourse a disturbing
debate about racial identity and more specifically the question of
'Africanisation' (Singh, 1996: 2).
The question of racial identity in South Africa has always been
treated in a facile manner. In the years preceding the end of apartheid,
and particularly the ascension of the Black Consciousness ideology in the
1970s, the designation 'black' was reserved for all South Africans
excluded from the vote, namely Africans, 'Coloured' and 'Indians'. The
parcelling of the public (and private) edifice of the country into 'white'
(European) and 'non-white' (non-European), and the exclusion of all 'nonwhites' from access to resources or adequate facilities, made possible this
temporary united racial front for the sole purpose of eliminating
apartheid. The establishment of the three-tiered system of Parliament in
the early 1980s was the catalyst that infused this united front with
vigour and enthusiasm. Widespread protests and continuous political
and social unrest finally led to the release of President Nelson Mandela,
and the historic political events that followed.24
However, immediately preceding the elections, and subsequently, it
has become clear that racial unity in South Africa was ephemeral,
despite the constitutional commitment and the rhetoric of non-racialism
and the rainbow nation. The final Constitution provides in its founding
provisions that 'the Republic of South African is one sovereign
democratic state founded on ... non-racialism and non-sexism'
(Constitution, 1996: Chapter I, s 1(6)). The racial divisions rear their
heads in several situations, but most profoundly around the question of
affirmative action. As is to be expected, and since they are an excluded
group, the majority of white South Africans oppose affirmative action
(although white women are the designated beneficiaries). The most
startling opposition has come from significant sections of the 'Coloured'
and Indian populations, whose attitudes are premised on the fear that
'Africanisation' in South Africa excludes all non-Africans. They therefore
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believe (incorrectly) that they will be excluded from the benefits of
affirmative action. President Mandela has continuously sought to
reassure 'Coloureds' and Indians that they too, like Africans, will be
beneficiaries of affirmative action. He has encouraged 'Coloureds' and
Indians, who believe that they have been denied access to particular
affirmative action programs, to lodge complaints with the appropriate
government department.
However, it appears increasingly that these reassurances have not
calmed the misgivings of 'Coloureds' and Indians, and conversely that
they have reinforced a view of Africanisation which borders on narrow

African nationalism (Singh, 1996: 2). The 'Coloured' population (the
majority population group in the Western Cape) and 'Indians' (a
significant majority in Natal) experienced the gamut of deprivations and
humiliations perpetrated by successive colonial governments and the
apartheid state. The test for the successful outcome of affirmative action
programs will be their ability to redress apartheid's wrongs for all
disadvantaged groups, given that 'disadvantage' was embedded in a
racial hierarchy shaped by apartheid laws and policies.25 Whether the
divisions and mistrust can be eroded is hard to predict; they do, however,
pose significant constraints on the move towards the non-racial future
now espoused.
Merit
One of the most enduring criticisms of affirmative action is the notion
that it abandons merit. Critics claim that unqualified people are given
positions and promoted, and that this lowers overall standards. The
United States appears to have grappled with this issue most intimately;
there standardised tests are used more than in any other society and a
host of entrance exams serve as gatekeepers for the various professions
and trades. Lichtenberg and Luban (1997: 21) and others have
interrogated the so-called objectivity of these tests, and have attempted
to distinguish the issue of the ability of members of disadvantaged
groups to meet professional standards, or to perform well on tests, from
the fairness of the tests themselves. Carter (1991: 50) has cogently
argued that affirmative action is not contrary to notions of meritocracy;
but a sound and workable affirmative action requires constant vigilance
to ensure that the requisite standards are always maintained.
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In South Africa the concept of merit has not really been subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. This is not to suggest that the meritocratic standards
do not exist; rather their substance and purpose have not been subjected
to a thoroughgoing critique. There are several obvious reasons, but two
are the most persuasive. First, a cursory examination of South African
educational testing requirements, as well as entrance examinations for
licence to practise in the various professions, still suggests a strong
colonial resonance. For example, one of the country's most dominant
professions, law, has strong historical roots in the Roman Dutch and
British legal traditions, both in form and substance. Professional
standards therefore have to be adjusted to accommodate the realities of
the post-colonial and post-apartheid South Africa, and to interrogate the
correlation between professional standards and how they are to be
assessed. Although the new constitutional order has laid the foundations
for a human rights culture, remnants of the colonial legal culture persist,
particularly in the common law.26 One of the remnants was the exclusion
of large numbers of Black people on questionable (read racial) grounds;
the new human rights culture calls for a certain inclusiveness with
respect to previously excluded groups.
Similarly, university and high school courses, and indeed the whole
educational endeavour, have only recently been subjected to a fundamental reorientation. The whole process of educational transformation
has proven to be a painful one, and has often left educators, particularly
those in the tertiary education system, bereft of an acceptable vision. It
is in the universities, and particularly the historically white universities,
that the battle about democratic education is most viciously fought.
These universities, historically modelled after their British counterparts,
have struggled to cope with increasing numbers of black students. A
significant number of these students are graduating with weak academic
skills because of the legacy of an inferior earlier education, and there is a
strong demand for the 'democratising' and 'Africanising' of their
educational institutions (Singh, 1996: 1). In short, questions about
examinations, or standards, and their relation to job or professional
requirements have rarely been tested in South Africa.
The second failure to interrogate the idea of merit in South Africa
needs mention rather than elaboration here. For decades, under the 'Job
Reservation' clause of the Industrial Conciliation Act 1956, certain
categories of jobs were set aside for whites, without the pretext that they
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had special skills or talents, but merely because they possessed white
skins. Sachs (1992) has suggested accordingly that the apartheid system
was one of the most successful affirmative action programs of this
century. In a system of labour aristocracy predicated on the possession of
a white skin, it is hard to argue the existence of meritocratic standards.
This is not to suggest that the question of merit or standards is a
baseless one, and that it only serves as a pretext for adversaries of
affirmative action to discredit such programs. However, the question as
to what constitutes merit is a complex one and at its most basic requires
some direct correlation between what is required of a candidate and that

candidate's formal qualifications. In other words, the standards imposed
need to be job related. In South Africa, the affirmative action program
which underpinned apartheid was an unabashed exercise in racial
preference. The affirmative action policy in place in South Africa today
requires that the new government put in place a preferential system
which does not just mimic the old system, but really ensures that merit
is not discarded. But the standards which constitute that merit need to
be thoroughly interrogated and not be used to exclude members of
previously disadvantaged communities on spurious grounds.

Section Three: Equality and Affirmative Action
By the early 1990s the drafters of the South African Constitution were
able to benefit from the thorough international interrogation that the
principle of equality had been subjected to by a range of scholars and
policy makers. They could particularly draw succour from progressive
inroads made by feminists and other critical scholars (Kramer, 1995:
265; Lahey, 1987: 5; Habermas, 1994: 107). Striking a balance between
de jure equality on the one hand, which could in certain circumstances
lead to further (socio-economic) inequality, and the need to incorporate
substantive equality on the other, was difficult. In short, they faced the
dilemma of a liberal constitutional framework, predicated on individual
rights, incorporating group or sectional interests which required legal
redress without the individual claim of unequal treatment. 2' This
quandary demanded that the state at times abandon its neutral stance
as arbiter of citizens equally situated, and affirmatively promote group
or sectional claims.
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In addition, references to the ideals of non-racism and non-sexism
are scattered throughout the South African Constitution. In the
Founding Provisions the Constitution tabulates the values that underpin
the democratic state, which include non-racialism and non-sexism. The
most significant provisions relating to racial and gender equality are
found in the Bill of Rights, and in particular the section on equality
(Chapter 2, s 9) This section embodies the commitment to equality before
the law and equal protection of the law, and provides that:
the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth
(Chapter 2, s 9(3)).
The prohibition on direct and indirect discrimination implicitly
acknowledges the invidiousness and tenacity of institutionalised discrimination (Thornton, 1990). This acknowledgment reflects the
dominant jurisprudential trends in liberal democracies where the
principle of equality has been valorised in constitutional and legislative
packages. Since the Constitution has only been part of the legal
landscape since 1994, there has not been a voluminous jurisprudence
interpreting its equality provisions. However, two cases, one emanating
in the Constitutional Court in 1996 and the other in the Pretoria High
Court in 1997, deal directly with the question of equality.2 8
In 1996 the Constitutional Court had occasion to rule on a
constitutional challenge by a prison inmate in response to an executive
order made by President Mandela under South Africa's interim Constitution which granted special remission of sentences for certain categories
of prisoners. The category which the prisoner challenged applied only to
'mothers ... with minor children' (Minister for Correctional Services v
Hugo, CCT/1 1/1996). The other categories included disabled persons and
all persons under the age of 18 years who had been in prison at the time
of South Africa's first elections in May 1994.29 The respondent had a 12year-old child, and he claimed that the provision in the Presidential Act
was in violation of the equality provisions of the interim Constitution
because it unfairly discriminated against him on the basis of sex or
gender. He argued that the Act, by releasing all mothers whose children
were under the age of 12, discriminated against fathers of children of the
same age. In fact, the discrimination was two-fold: only women who were
parents (of children under 12) were released; childless women were not.
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The President's legal team argued that the rationale for the special
remission of mothers of minor children was based on the 'special role
that mothers play in the care and nurturing of young children'
The
court accepted that even though the President was motivated by the
generalisation that mothers are primarily responsible for the care of
small children (which could not be universally true), this did not render
the discrimination unfair. They distinguished between the situation
where women as a group are deprived of benefits based on their childrearing responsibilities, to the situation under consideration where such
women were given a positive benefit.3 The court then considered the
claim of unfairness arising from the exclusion of men from the disadvantaged category. Of course, the backdrop to the question was the
identification of members of disadvantaged categories under the
affirmative action measures found in s 9 of the Constitution.
Although the court was of the opinion that belonging to a
disadvantaged group did not render the discrimination fair per se, it saw
the need:
to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on
the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that
goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that
goal is achieved (Ministerfor CorrectionalServices v Hugo: 36).32
The court appears to provide an expansive interpretation of unfair
discrimination, going beyond the notion of formal equality, to one of
substantive equality in line with a growing body of feminist legal theory.
Feminist scholars have advocated for an interpretation of equality theory
that recognises the real experiences of women; they reject a theory that
is abstract and formal and does not address structural inequality
(Majury, 1987: 180). However the Constitutional Court has not had
occasion to confront squarely the issue of affirmative action. A State
Supreme Court has, however, and its decision gave pause to supporters
of affirmative action.
In Public Servants' Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice
(1997) the court addressed a challenge by some white male attorneys to
an affirmative action program adopted by the Ministry of Justice. Up
until 1994 the public service in South Africa, and particularly the senior
ranks, was dominated by white males. Indeed, it is generally accepted
that the election of the Nationalist Party in South Africa in 1948
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spawned a highly successful affirmative action program for South
African whites, particularly Afrikaners, which was sustained for over
four decades. The newly elected government in South Africa was faced
with the task of integrating, indeed penetrating, this racial monolith.
This task was made all the more daunting by the political compromise
fashioned during the constitutional negotiations which secured the
tenured positions of white public servants (Sparks, 1995).
With respect to the new public service, the interim Constitution
provided that it should 'promote an efficient public administration
broadly representative of the South African community' (s 212(2)(b)). It
also required, however, that the public service should be rationalised
rapidly to assist in its efficacy (s 237). The lawsuit was launched after
the Ministry of Justice earmarked certain posts for promotion to be filled
by members of previously disadvantaged groups, namely blacks, women
and disabled persons, contrary to the provisions of the Public Service
Staff Code. In terms of the Code, promotional decisions were to take into
account the qualifications, level of training, merit, efficiency and
suitability of the candidates for promotion. Extraneous factors such as
race, gender and disability were prima facie not to be taken into account.
Meanwhile to expedite the entry into the public service of significant
numbers of members of formerly disadvantaged groups, the Public
Service Act was amended in 1994. 33 The white males who were excluded
from applying for the promotions were all experienced attorneys who had
been employed in senior positions in the Ministry of Justice for periods
ranging from five to 25 years. The were joined in the lawsuit by their
professional association.
The issues which the court had to address involved the
interpretation and balancing of four sections of the interim Constitution.
Section 212(2)(b) provided that the public service should 'promote an
efficient public administration broadly representative of the South
African community'. Section 212(4) provided that the 'suitability' of
candidates should be taken into account when making appointments and
promotions. Section 212(5) provided that the requirement of 'suitability'
should 'not preclude measures' designed to achieve representivity of the
broader South African community, including their race, gender or
disability. These constitutional provisions pertaining to the public
service were underpinned by a general provision (s 8(3)(a)) of the interim
Constitution which provided that:
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This [equality] section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve
the adequate protection and advancement of persons disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of
all rights and freedoms.3
The court held that the constitutional provision in s 8(3)(a), which
provided for affirmative action as not being contrary to the notion of
equality, did not prima facie shield it from judicial review. The court
attached specific conditions to certain words in the provision, namely,
'designed', 'adequate' and 'equal'. The court took the view that the term
'designed' did not license 'mere intention' and 'haphazard or random
action', but required thoughtful measures designed to achieve a explicit
goal. In other words, there had to be 'a causal connection between the
designed measures and the objectives (640H).
The court limited the requirement of 'adequate' to its ordinary
dictionary meaning of 'suitable or sufficient'. The court stipulated that
any affirmative action measures adopted was not permitted to go beyond
that which is adequate; that the end envisaged as well as the means
employed is reviewable (640J and 641A). With respect to the condition of
'equal' the court considered that the interests of the targeted persons or
groups were not be considered in a vacuum, but also 'with regard to the
rights of others and the interests of the community and the possible
disadvantages that the targeted persons or groups may suffer' (641C).
With respect to s 212(2), (4) and (5), the court held that the
requirement of 'efficiency' was to be accorded the same weight as
'representivity', and that 'promote' was not synonymous with 'achieve
immediately (642C). In other words, integrating the public service, that
is, achieving representivity, was not to occur in a vacuum, but ought to
be conducted alongside other constitutional requirements, such as
efficiency. Although the 'suitability' of candidates included their race,
gender or disability, other criteria such as qualifications and merit could
not be sacrificed to the imperative of 'representivity'.
The court applied these principles to the facts in question, and
concluded that the affirmative action measures adopted by the Ministry
of Justice could not pass constitutional muster. The court found them
'haphazard, random and over-hasty', that they failed to meet the
requirements of 'designed' and 'adequate' as mandated by the
Constitution, and that they unfairly discriminated against the excluded
white male candidates (642-6). The Minister of Justice did not appeal the
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court's decision, but instead went back to the drawing board to comply
with the requirements outlined in the court's ruling. Although at first
glance the ruling appears alarming to supporters of affirmative action, a
close reading suggests that the court was not questioning the
constitutionality of affirmative action, but was merely attempting to
place suitable Constitutional parameters within which the programs
could operate.

Section Four: The Possibilities and Limitations of
Affirmative Action
Since affirmative action policies and programs have only been in
existence in South Africa for a few years, the conclusions about their
success or otherwise that can be drawn at this stage are rather tentative.
Moreover, such an assessment is linked to an overall evaluation of the
political transformation in South Africa, since affirmative action is a key
component of transformation. Part of the difficulty lies in drawing the
boundaries between those programs which are appropriately labelled
'affirmative action', and those that can be categorised as social welfare
programs. In other words, even though one can distinguish between
those measures constitutionally protected to ensure 'representivity' in
the public and private institutions of the society, and those basic needs
that the state pledges to meet as part of the parcel of rights encapsulated
in the Constitution, an assessment of the success of affirmative action
involves both. In short, evaluating the effectiveness of affirmative
programs cannot occur outside an overall assessment of political and
economic transformation because of the official decision to hitch
affirmative action to the overall transformational project.
If affirmative action is to be deemed successful35 it has to achieve
more than cosmetic results. The record in other societies where
affirmative action programs are in place suggests that certain steps may
preclude this. With respect to prospective beneficiaries, one of the
constant criticisms of affirmative action in South Africa is that only the
black elite or those who need assistance least will benefit. This criticism
is only partly true. It is undisputed that the most qualified male black
candidates and women are the ones most likely in the short term to
benefit from affirmative action. But that is the purpose of affirmative
action: first, to provide immediate access to employment (and to scarce
places in higher education too, to the historically excluded) and, second,

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

to adopt appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the pool of likely
candidates from the previously excluded community grows. The current
reality in South Africa is that the legacy of apartheid, discussed in
Section One, has left the pool of black candidates likely to immediately
benefit from affirmative action quite small. Moreover, this legacy of
economic inequality has, at least for the foreseeable future, rendered
race and class interchangeable. However, if affirmative action programs
are to remain popular, particularly among the majority of black South
Africans, and if they are in the long run going to achieve what they were
designed to, their application cannot be confined to reinforcing a (small)
black middle class (Daley, 1997: 1).
The success of affirmative action is predicated on careful planning,
supportive structures and good faith efforts. Where affirmative action
follows a legislative directive, good policy would suggest that its interpretation and regulation should be flexible and should accommodate to
the peculiarity of each institution and the specific circumstances of each
affirmative action program. The architects of the new constitutional and
political order could not have considered that affirmative action would be
an unthinking replacement of whites with blacks. What was surely
envisaged was a transformation that would harness the skills of all
South Africans and not just a minority of the population.
In the employment sphere, it is clear that a workable affirmative
action program demands a rethink of the corporate culture, values and
language, and an accommodation and sensitivity in the workplace to
cultural and/or language differences. An effective affirmative action
strategy requires a reconsideration of the communications network
within corporate organisation. Specifically such a strategy will address
informal networks which had hitherto excluded blacks and women from
access to important employment related information (Sachs, 1993;
Thornton, 1997: 310).
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs in South Africa
is not much cause for concern. This bargain was struck early on and,
despite the Pretoria Supreme Court's decision, the constitutional
mandate has not been affected. The concern, however, is one of policy,
and raises the central question about whether affirmative action is good
policy in light of the government's commitment to the philosophy of nonracialism. This concern is not just confined to South Africa. As we end
the millennium, global developments indicate that affirmative action
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predicated on racial or ethnic identity is a gamble. In Africa particularly,
the task of nation-building has required a 'downplaying' of identity
politics.36 South Africa's history of racial classification makes this a
particularly precarious enterprise. However, it would be impossible for
South Africa to achieve democracy without affirmative action. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the gross inequities left by successive
colonial governments and the apartheid state requires a massive
redistribution through a series of governmental interventions. The South
African government cannot afford to let developments in the market
provide the incremental pace; it has to intervene to make non-racialism
possible.
But affirmative action in South Africa needs to face head on some
important challenges. Their political popularity and constitutional
acceptance will not protect the programs and policies from the same
kinds of shortcomings and abuses experienced in other societies where
such forms of social engineering have been tested. There are some
fundamental issues which have to be confronted. Affirmative action is
not social welfare legislation. The provision of education, housing,
electricity, sanitation and other basic needs of people is ultimately the
task of the government and essentially depends on resource availability.
With respect to affirmative action, however, and because of the huge
disparities in income based on the historical patterns of discrimination,
many black people today are unable or unlikely in the short term to
benefit from affirmative action programs. But the provision of basic
needs by the state, and in particular education, may make it possible and
may speed up the process of likely benefits for more people through
affirmative action.
Affirmative action is not the panacea for the continuing inequalities
in South Africa, and it will not address all the discrepancies and
deprivation. But it goes some way to addressing the problems and
creating the conditions for equity and diversity. Its success will depend
on constant vigilance to ensure that it achieves its objectives. President
Mandela's statement locates the significance of affirmative action in
South Africa:
Until a few years ago the term affirmative action was virtually unknown
in our country. Now it is one of the most widely debated concepts in the
land. For millions it is a beacon of positive expectation, a promise of better
things to come. For others it is an alarming spectre which they see as a
threat to their personal security and a menace to the integrity of public
life (Mandela, note 10).
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Today there are threats to personal security and the integrity of public
life. But the culprit is not affirmative action; it may just be continued
economic inequality.

Notes
*

1.

2.

Penelope E Andrews is Associate Professor, City University of New York,
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Sue Chang and Maureen
McCafferty for invaluable clerical assistance, and the City University of New
York School of Law for research support.
The collapse of the Eastern European governments dealt both a substantive
and ideological blow to those who had advocated a program of economic
redistribution in South Africa: see Adam and Moodley, 1993; also Sparks,
1995.
This concept is sometimes referred to as preferential treatment, benign
discrimination, or reverse discrimination. The concept of 'affirmative action'
incorporates a myriad of programs and can mean many different things.
They can include:
*
outreach programs to broaden the pool of eligible individuals to include
more members of 'disadvantaged minorities' or women;
*
targeted or compensatory training to upgrade the qualifications of
individuals of minority populations or women;
*
goals and timetables to measure progress;
*

3.

4.

preferences;

*
set-asides (for example, in government contracts and licences);
*
actual quotas (see Galston, 1997).
The debate within the United States is an interesting point of reference, both
because of its intensity, and because affirmative action concepts (as legal
mechanisms) first found fertile ground there. Americans have generally been
divided in their support for affirmative action. The statistics suggest that
affirmative action has always been more popular amongst African-Americans
than amongst their white counterparts: see Terkel, 1992, and Marable, 1996;
see also Zelnick, 1996. Although both racial minorities and women benefit
from affirmative action programs, my reference is largely to the impact of
affirmative action on racial minorities, and more specifically AfricanAmericans. This is so because race relations remain 'America's constant
curse' (President Clinton in his inauguration address, January 1997). Even
though the statistics suggest that middle class white women have been the
overwhelming beneficiaries of affirmative action programs, much of the
popular debate focuses on the benefits to African-Americans: see Banks in
this volume.
Reference to the negotiations in this article refers to CODESA 1 (the first
multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa) which commenced in
December 1991; the second Convention CODESA 11, which commenced in
May 1992; and the third session, normally referred to as the Multi-Party
Negotiating Forum or the World Trade Centre talks which commenced in
April 1993 after a lengthy breakdown over violence and key constitutional
issues. For an insightful account of the negotiations, see Sparks, 1995; see
also Friedman and Atkinson, 1994.
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5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

Arguably the Malaysian affirmative action experiment was more ambitious.
The program there involved set-asides and allocations in not only education
and employment, but political participation at the local and national level:
see Putchacheary, 1991: 61; and Havanur, 1992.
See the Reconstruction and Development Program, African National
Congress (1994). The Reconstruction and Development Program was
introduced by the ANC as a five year plan of governance. Since 1994, it has
been modified to accommodate the economic challenges facing the
government. With respect to affirmative action, it has been noted that:
the ANC conception of affirmative action is more expansive, yet more
fundamental than the American conception because it not only includes
measures to redress past discrimination, but also requires public and
private actors to build an equal society through redistribution and
corrective policies (Robinson, 1993: 513).
See generally Reconstruction and Development Program ANC (1994). In this
respect the South African approach may mirror that in India with respect to
the 'Scheduled Castes'; see Mendelsohn in this volume.
A few years after the RDP was published, the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution Program (GEAR) was launched, ostensibly a more realistic
plan to accommodate South Africa's national needs and place in the global
economy: see Bassett, 1988: 26.
Affirmative action policies are intended to benefit women as well as black
South Africans: see Andrews, 1996. However, because of the legacy of
racism, the present chapter will largely focus on race-conscious affirmative
action without specific reference to gender even though it is recognised that
black women, and particularly African women, were the most disadvantaged
members of the South African polity: see Wing, 1995: 8. I use the term 'black'
to include all people labelled as 'non-white' under apartheid South Africa's
racial classification laws, which include people classified as 'coloured' as well
as Indian South Africans.
The Hon Nelson Mandela, Statement on Affirmative Action in Affirmative
Action in South Africa: Conference Proceedings(1991).
The racial hierarchy mandated by apartheid provided for differentials
amongst 'non-white peoples' - groups classified as Indian, Coloured, and
African: see Apartheid: The Facts (1983).
The comparison with the United States is most appropriate because of the
shared history of racial segregation of the two societies and because the
racial debates often appear to overlap. However, there are huge
demographic, historical, and cultural differences between the two societies
which are also worth noting. For a discussion of the comparisons between
these two societies, see Ford, 1996.
The notion of preferential treatment was first articulated by President
Lyndon B Johnson in an oft-quoted address to Howard University in 1965:
'You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race and then say, "You are
free to compete with all the others" and still justly believe you have been
completely fair' (quoted in Rossein, 1990: 20-11, n 31). Similar sentiments
were echoed by Blackmun J in Regents of Californiav Bakke (1987).
Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (adopted by the UN
General Assembly in New York on 21 December 1965, entered into force on 4
January 1969).
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15. GA Res 180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess, Agenda Item 75, UN doc. A/RES/34/180
91980.
16. This section deals with the issue in a perfunctory manner only. It is
elaborated in the other chapters of this volume, especially that of Chibundu.
17. See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co (1971); United Jewish
Organisations,Inc v Carey (1977); United Steelworkers v Weber (1979).
18. The benefits of affirmative action have been described as follows:
*
that it provides occupational and educational advancement for members
of disadvantaged communities and women;
*
that it allows for beneficiaries the accumulation of valuable experience;
*
that it provides for the expansion of the professional and entrepreneurial
class who are able to pass on the benefits to the next generation;
*
that it makes available role models from disadvantaged communities
and women;
*
that it results in the eradication of debilitating and negative stereotypes
of groups;
*
that society benefits from the involvement of women and members of
disadvantaged communities in the provision of essential services (for
example, service in the police and emergency services);
*
that it encourages integration which represents the society's
commitment to the ideals of racial equality and opportunity.
For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Sachs, 1992; Brooks,
1990; Harris, 1993; Kennedy, 1990; Adams 1993.
19. Reddy, 1997. These issues are explored in depth by Mendelsohn in this
volume.
20. I state these 'formal' requirements uncritically, although it is worth bearing
in mind that their articulation and operation occurred in a system of job
reservation for whites, particularly Afrikaners. Obviously nepotism and
cronyism was rife in that system, but we can assume at best that these
requirements were on occasion demanded, and at worst that they were given
some lip service for appointment and promotion purposes.
21. There are whites who hold ministries and senior government posts, but they
are a minority.
22. This section of the Act resembles aspects of the Australian Affirmative
Action (Equal Employment Opportunityfor Women) Act 1986 (Cth).
23. It is worth noting, however, that some companies have introduced
affirmative action programs and with some success. But overall the record is
quite disillusioning. See Marcia Kelin 'More Not Better with Affirmative
Action in South Africa' Business Times 7 September 1997, 55. See also Don
Robertson 'Affirmative Action Loses its Ranking Management Priorities
Business' Times 7 September 1997, 49. But even in the public sector the
government continues to face significant obstacles to affirmative action. See
David Greybe 'Failure on Affirmative Action Will be Punished' Business Day
10 February 1998, 53.
24. The South African government, faced by an increasingly weak economy,
political and economic isolation, and widespread internal protests,
introduced a three-tiered system of Parliament in 1983, in which Whites,
'Coloured' and 'Indians' had a vote, but which excluded the majority African
population. This development triggered massive political campaigns by trade
unions and community organisations, and increased the intensity of antiapartheid activity particularly in Western Europe, the United States and
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25.

26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

Australia. Sanctions legislation was introduced in many of these societies,
and finally in 1990, the ruling Nationalist Party agreed to release President
Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, unban all political organisations
so banned, and set in motion the process of negotiations which led to the
drawing up of the interim constitution and the first democratically elected
government. See Friedman and Atkinson, 1994.
The Population Registration Act 1950, repealed in 1991, classified South
Africans into various racial groups broadly white, 'coloured', 'Indian' and
African with different subgroups in each of the 'non-white' categories. The
Act also provided for individuals to be classified as 'honorary whites' or to be
re-classified within the various racial groups (Bindman, 1988: 4).
Whether the Roman Dutch or British common law protected human rights in
the old apartheid order has been subject to much scrutiny by legal scholars.
See, for example, Dugard, 1978. Without delving into the debate, it is a fairly
uncontested notion that the new constitutional order, and particularly the
Bill of Rights, has the potential to provide much greater human rights
protection than was previously the situation in South Africa.
The South African Constitution reflects the compromises reached to deal
with the conflicting visions of the new democratic order. These visions
included, but were not limited, to competing claims of redistribution of land
(for African communities rendered landless under apartheid) versus
protection of individual property rights; the protection of traditional law and
institutions versus the claims of gender equality; the right to freedom of
speech versus the outlawing of racial slurs and hate speech: see Sparks,
1995.
The Constitutional Court is the highest court in the country. The case in the
Pretoria Supreme Court was not appealed to the Constitutional Court, so it
still stands as precedent on this issue.
Presidential Act No 17 1994.
The President's affidavit stated that he:
'was motivated predominantly by a concern for children who had been
deprived of the nurturing and care which their mothers would ordinarily
have provided. ... I am ... aware that imprisonment inevitably has
harsh consequences for the family of the prisoner. ... Account was taken
of the special role ... that mothers play in the care and nurturing of
young children (CCT 11/96: 30).
The court referred to Incorporated Law Society v Wookey (1912), the
judgment which deprived women of the right to practise law.
Justice O'Regan's concurring opinion makes the point even stronger:
To determine whether the discrimination is unfair it is necessary to
recognise that although the long-term goal of our constitutional order is
equal treatment, insisting upon equal treatment in circumstances of
established inequality may well result in the entrenchment of that
inequality ... There is no doubt that the goal of equality entrenched in
our Constitution would be better served if the responsibilities of child
rearing were more fairly shared between fathers and mothers. The
simple fact of the matter is that at present they are not ... We cannot
ignore this crucial fact in considering the impact of the discrimination in
this case (Presidentof South Africa v Hugo (1996: 87-8)).
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33. Proclamation 103 of 1994. The Proclamation was promulgated in pursuance
of the constitutional directive (s 212(5)) to integrate the public service as
speedily as possible.
34. This section was altered somewhat in the final Constitution, specifying that
the measures be taken as positive and not defensive.
35. Perhaps it can be judged 'successful' if there is a positive answer to the
question whether black people, women and disabled people are more
represented in the workplace and are economically in a better position than
they were during the apartheid years.
36. I recognise that this characterisation is a gross simplification of the
complicated process of nation-building in many countries in Africa. In fact,
racial or ethnic identity has been used in the most opportunistic ways to
maintain dominance in fragile democracies. My point really is that in order
for national reconstruction to proceed in situations of multi-ethnic
communities, the national identity becomes pre-eminent vis-a-vis ethnic
identity: see Chanock, 1998.
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